In today's rapid evolution of computing and networking technologies, the user community unavoidably has to deal with the shifting computation paradigm that is characterized by highly mobile and powerful pervasive computing devices and the resulting fragmentation and distribution of data. The security underpinnings that were originally designed for the traditional consolidated data model and static access methods can no longer satisfy new challenges in this highly dynamic environment. In this paper, we focus on the critical trust management issues in the upcoming UC paradigm and propose a trust management framework based on "community of trust" concept.
I. Introduction

I.A. Background
biquitous computing (UC) is a natural extension of today's distributed computing paradigm. It is omnipresent and involves pervasive, heterogeneous, and often smaller computing devices (such as sensors, RFID, JTRS) integrated via wireless, embedded, and/or mobile communication technologies. For example, aircrafts, unmanned vehicles, ships, ground vehicles, soldiers equipped with wearable sensors and holding JTRS devices will be connected in concert to accomplish a common mission in the future battlefield. On the commercial side, sensors densely distributed at supply warehouse, factory, airport, even on-board airplane, together with RFID tags embedded in mobile objects, will create a highly automatic, situation aware environment for conducting business and reducing human labor and errors. UC will be indispensable in next-generation aviation systems and products.
In contrast to legacy computation model, UC brings in extra information assurance challenges such as ad hoc collaboration, extreme mobility, heterogeneous domains, and dynamic interactions complexity. Within this context, the realization of UC depends on the ability to ensure services availability and trustworthy information exchanges. By focusing on key technology components such as cross-domain trust modeling and management, this paper is aimed to provide a secure foundation to enable the upcoming UC applications and products.
Trust is the basis to determine information access rights and the enabler for collaborations across domains. In the UC paradigm, a mobile network node will potentially interact with numerous nodes from different domains for a coalition, as well as leverage available (foreign) infrastructure for information access while on the move. However, trust establishment among entities from heterogeneous domains without past interaction or prior agreed policy, is a challenge. Meanwhile, excessive trust granted can result in information assurance threats while insufficient trust provided could inhabit the capabilities of collaborative efforts. Trust is a fundamental yet non-trivial issue to be addressed.
I.B. System Constraints and Requirements
In this section, we analyze the special challenges on trust management in tomorrow's UC, when compared to conventional computing environments, and identify the implications and the requirements of the challenges on the solutions to UC trust management.
• Lack of centralized authority: In the UC, a mobile agent will interact with foreign infrastructure and agents in new computing environments seek and offer resources with these new infrastructure and agents to form a resource rich computing environment. A stationary agent can also form such a resource-sharing environment with new mobile UC agents traveling into its vicinity. However, it is unrealistic to assume the existence of a centralized authority, which manages the trust relationships among all the UC agents sharing their resource and capabilities. Even if a trusted authority exists for some of agents, the authority may not be always accessible. The lack of a trusted centralized authority implies the UC trust management to be of distributed nature and requires autonomy and intelligence in agents for trust evaluations.
• Heterogeneous models of trust: A UC entity will encounter other entities of various capabilities and intelligence, including low-end sensors and advanced smart phones, and of heterogeneous trust methods and models. Strong authentication based trust, such as public key certificate based authentication, may not always be available or feasible due to resource constraint and the lack of the common trusted authority. References based, such as distributed PGP-kind of trust, or experience based trust, i.e. trust based on past experience and behaviors, can constitute the main basis for determining information sharing rights. Two communicating parties, who want to establish a coalition, may carry their own policies for authentication and authorization. They need to negotiate for permitting access to each other's resources. The UC trust management is required to accommodate and integrate multiple models of trust, enable nodes of different trust models to negotiate and collaborate.
• Multiple levels of trust: Not only the trust models can be diverse, the level of trust established can be different, based on which the authorizable actions will be different. For example, public key certificate based only establish binary trust levels, i.e., either 0 (full denial) or 1 (complete trust), while reference and experience based trust can be of multiple or even continuous levels of trust. While fine-grained trust enables fine granularity in access control, it incurs more computation and management overhead than the management of coarse grained trust (a few discrete levels of trust, in analog to club memberships).
A balance needs to be made between fine-tuned access authorization and complexity of system operation and maintenance. To accommodate multiple levels of trust, the management of trust should be flexible and configurable.
• Diverse mobility models (including extreme mobility): In a slow-moving or stationary computing environment, it is feasible to build a profile of an interacting party via history records and determine the trust level of the party. In a highly mobile environment, the duration of interaction between agents is short and the scenarios observed are generally transient. Therefore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate the level of trustworthiness in the interacting party. One potential is to assess the trust level of the received information rather than that of the information source, i.e., the entity itself. By comparing and coordinating data received through multiple sources, the true or false information can be identified, which in turns help to estimate the trust level of an entity as the data source. Short duration of interaction of mobile UC devices requires trust assessment algorithms to be efficient and fast.
• High dynamics in trust group: Due to the pervasive appearance of UC devices and agents, a coalition, i.e., a formation of a group, to accomplish a complicated task in a concerted manner is natural in the UC. In fact, the coalition/ group structure underpins the UC. Due to mobility, dynamics in node's interest and goals, and change in tasks' phases, a group can be formed, dissolved, combined with other coalitions or split, with group members joining and leaving. Such dynamics create challenges in trust group management, including granting new members the access to shared data, and preventing deleted members from obtaining future information. The approaches for trust group management are required to be efficient, to avoid "one affects all" scenario, such as rebuilt the entire trust group when only one node leaves.
• Privacy concern: Many UC devices are personal gadgets that can be uniquely traced to the owner. In the process of sharing information in order to expand its capability and accessible resources, a UC agent may also have a privacy concern. The preference for privacy may in turn, for example, prevent information release and sharing, making it hard to build trust. A delicate balance has to be achieved between privacy concern and trust evaluation, and the trust management need take into account privacy concerns if UC applications require. A policy-driven approach can be a candidate for privacypreserving trust management, due to the power of policies in describing detailed conditions, including privacy concern.
• Open computing environment: In a dynamic UC environment, a mobile UC will form collaboration with new agents or their surrounding infrastructure on the move as needed. It is impossible to preconstruct a list of participants that a mobile UC agent will interact and cooperate. Lack of a predetermined list of collaborators and their associated domains is the main feature of the UC, i.e., open computing environment. Open nature of the UC implies the inapplicability of some conventional authentication methods such as certificate based authentication or trust based on past experience, due to the inaccessibility to the common trust certificate authority, the lack of a shared identity management (hence for authorization) and/or pre-established relationship. The trust management in UC hence has to be open, providing a variety of trust establishment options to accommodate potentially a diversity of scenarios and offering methods for building trust on the spot without required prior knowledge of each other.
• Large scale System of Systems (SoS): With the advances in computing, wireless, communication, device technologies, the number of nodes available in the UC will be enormous. The number of nodes in a coalition of UC entities can be large, and in addition, the integration of these coalitions will create a highly information and resource rich, large scale of SoS. To realize the large scale information rich UC, the trust management solution needs to be scalable. The approaches to achieve scalable trust management include (1) efficient algorithms in terms of computation, communication and/or storage for trust evaluation and establishment, so to handle access requests and information exchange from a potentially large number of collaborative nodes; (2) distributed rather than centralized, such as peer-topeer management of trust.
• Support of multiple applications: There is a wealth of potential UC applications, such as Telemedicine, social networking, sensors network for surveillance, and vehicular networks. Each applications has its unique requirements on implementation, however, a generic trust module underlying all the UC application will be ideal as it increases reusability & scalability. A trust management solution is preferred to be adaptive to the diverse applications. In addition to the constraints listed above, there are other challenges such as heterogeneous UC device interfaces and capabilities (including resource constrained devices). Resource constraints in UC devices once again mandate the efficiency in the trust management solution. Moreover, wireless medium is the main means for UC agents and devices to communicate and collaborate. Wireless communication has its own vulnerabilities due to its open broadcast medium, such as frequent communication failure. We assume reliable wireless transmission and seamless integration of UC devices of heterogeneous are realized in the lower layers than the application layer that manages trust in the OSI network stack model.
In the following table, we summarize the challenges/constraints that confront the UC trust management and the corresponding requirements that address these challenges and constraints. Table 1 : The constraints on UC trust management and the requirements imposed by the constraints. An "X" indicates the requirement (partially) addresses the constraint.
II. Related Work
Security and privacy in ubiquitous computing has attracted a lot of research attention in recent years. In [1] , Joshi et al. presented the challenges in providing strong assurance of reliability and trustworthiness of information and services in UC environments, and proposed using declarative policy-driven and distributed trust and reputation management approaches to handle the open and dynamic nature of ubiquitous computing systems. However, neither security architecture nor discussion on how to integrate and implement these two approaches is provided. The trust and reputation management suggested in this paper is limited to experience or reference based only, which is often used in ad hoc networks. In their early works [2] [3], the research group has proposed policy-enabled separation of duties and delegation to enforce access control to pervasive computing systems. In another trust based approach for UC [4] , Shand et al pointed out that experience based trust is inadequate to address dynamics of UC environment due to the frequent update requirement, and suggested recommendation (reference) based trust is better suited. Using phone book exchange service in PDA as the illustrative example, they presented the approach to formally order the recommendations according to information contents and integrate risk management with the trust management framework. Their approach gears toward peer-to-peer or ad hoc networks, but lacks in the discussion of leveraging infrastructure when available for trust management.
In [5] , Hill et al presented architecture and implementation of a programmable middleware solution, called HESTIA, for providing security, privacy and reliability in UB cyber infrastructure. In this solution, users are assumed to be pre-determinable and register with the system, rendering HESTIA not well suited for open UC scenarios. Other research works on middleware platform for UC systems include SMARKS [6] and GAIA [7] . SMARKS is a prototype for portable devices, addressing device validation, trust modeling, and privacy protection issues. For device validation, every device is required to share a pre-distributed common secret, which may not be satisfiable in the completely open UC environment. GAIA introduces "active space" that integrates a physical space and its ubiquitous computing devices into a programmable computing system. However, GAIA's activities have to be confined in the active space only.
In [8] , a middleware based trusted broker is prototyped to enable a remote device to access personal resource onthe-fly. The authentication of the device is by the physical proximity of the user and the device. This idea of proximity-based authentication is novel, but is not general enough to cover all the authentication cases in the UC environment. In the proposed and implemented middleware architecture for smart home access [9] , Main et al differentiated the assurance levels of the different authentication methods, and enforced a user's rights to be dependent on the authentication assurance levels. In [10] , the problem of trust delegation among multiple portable devices belonged to the same user is investigated and a trust transfer protocol is presented. However, whether trust is transferable among multiple devices of the same owner needs further study and confirmation. A security architecture for smart pervasive computing environment described in [11] consists of three modules: authentication, authorization and policy management modules, in which authentication is the basic security building block. The authentication is an integrated module of server-based, peer-to-peer based, and PKI-based methods. However, the authentication requires device pre-registration, which cannot be guaranteed in all the UC applications. A trusted platform module (TPM) based approach is proposed for pervasive computing [12] . However, not every UC mobile device is resource-rich to be equipped with the TPM hardware and software.
Other noteworthy works on UC security and privacy include [13] [14] [15] . Using the technique of blind signature, Ren and Lou proposed protocols for anonymous mutual authentication between a mobile user and services to protect user's privacy [13] . They also leveraged hash chain, instead of public-key based authentication, at every transaction, to provide algorithm efficiency. However, their approach requires pre-registration of users, and services' willingness to blind sign credentials to enable user's anonymous access later is questionable. In [14] , Yan and Helal emphasized the interaction and merge of physical and cyber worlds in the future UC environment and predicted cyber faults can impose physical hazards. They hence proposed risk mitigation and fault tolerance approaches, such as device validation, service regulation, and user profile monitoring, to protect users' physical safety that can be impacted from the cyber world. In [15] , Ramakrishna focused on the problem of automated negotiation for generation of service access agreements in ubiquitous computing environment. He designed a general purpose protocol for policy negotiation and implemented the negotiation within policy management subsystem for ubiquitous devices and group. Policy negotiation between multiple devices with heterogeneous trust models needs further investigation.
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III. Amoeba: Our Framework for Trust Management in UC III.A. Definitions
We envision that in the UC environment, there will be enormous autonomous and intelligent entities interacting by discovering each other's existence, identifying available resource of each other and their surrounding infrastructure, negotiating the access, evaluating the trust based on their policies, constructing, re-and/or deconstructing a trust group in which entities are trusted to share and leverage information, capabilities, resources and services for collaboratively accomplishing a common goal or mission. We call such a goal-driven (or mission-driven), policyenabled trust group of UC entities Ubiquitous Community of Trust (UCOT). A UCOT generally undergoes high dynamics in membership and associated resources and services, due to high mobility in UC entities, changes in their connectivity, and the evolving nature of mission accomplishment stages, and the reaction to changing situation or environment. A UCOT can also merge with another UCOT or split based on their current goal. Therefore, we also call such a mission-driven trust group in the UC an "amoeba", to character its constantly evolving shape and size.
COI and COT:
Community of interest (COI) and community of trust (COT) have similarity, as in both communities, the entities provide, consume and exchange information and data of their interest. However, COT differs from COI, in that COI may not necessarily trust each other while in COT, trust was established and community members can share more than one topic of interest and can collaboratively achieve common goals. Furthermore, COT in the UC (UCOT) normally experiences higher dynamics than COI, due to mobility of UC entities, their changing situations, and dynamics in mission stages. COT can be regarded as high dynamic, goaldriven, policy-enabled and trust-based COI.
III.B. Components
An amoeba has one static component goal/mission and three dynamic components (1) one or more agents, (2) resources (or assets) accessible to all agents, and (3) one set of policies that governs accessing rules in joining, leaving and maintaining the amoeba. Each agent may also carries its own resource not intended for sharing in the amoeba (such as private information) and its own access policy. These resources and policies are not part of amoeba.
Agent: "an autonomous entity that acts based on situation and directs its activities toward goal achieving" (Wikipedia). An agent has resources and one set of privacy/security policy that defines the access to the agent's resource and the interaction with other agents.
Resource / Asset: something that has value and is owned by an agent. The resource/asset can be physical such as antenna of a mobile device, or informational (electronic data) such as electronic health records. Because resources/assets are of values, of limited availability, and of different levels of privacy sensitivities, the access to resources/assets need to be protected and controlled.
Policy: "a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and defining acceptable procedures" (www.mw.com). Each agent has its own privacy/security policy set, which determines external access to its resource/assets and guides the negotiation with the amoeba's policy when attempting to join an amoeba. In an amoeba, there will be one set of policy. It is generally created by the amoeba's initiator (the agent who starts an amoeba). The set of policy needs to remain consistent through out a particular phase of amoeba's mission. However, when the mission progresses from one stage to the next (e.g. patient moved from operation to recovery), the policy set can be updated to enforce the new requirements needed by the new phase. In addition to the standard (e.g. XACML) entitlement/role-based access control, amoeba policy set also utilizes the inherent trust property embedded in the model to implement the unique "trust-based" access control.
Goal / Mission: An amoeba is created to fulfill a common goal. The goal/mission might have several stages, but the overall goal/mission of an amoeba is relatively stable when compared to the other three components, i.e., agents, assets, and the policy that can be updated.
The three dynamic components in an amoeba will be illustrated in example scenarios in next section.
III.C. Turst Establishment in UC Amoeba Module Service
From the scalability and reusability perspectives, the Amoeba framework is a generic trust module to provide service to a wide variety of UC applications. In this open architecture, UC applications are responsible for defining the goal (or the mission policies), discovering potential Amoeba members, making revocation decision based on current goal and situations, and inquiring for trust relationship confirmation, but relying on the Amoeba module for trust group establishment and management, as shown in Figure 1 . This open architecture takes the cumbersome burden of application decision making away from the Amoeba module and simplify the overall Amoeba framework. In the next subsection, we will present different approaches for trust evaluation and establishment in the UC environment, but defer the group management for future study.
Trust Models in UC
As discussed, a diversity of trust evaluation and establishment approaches need to be provided to accommodate heterogeneous trust models and open computing environment in the UC.
(1) Cryptographic authentication based trust
The authentication based on public key certificate provides a high level of assurance in recognizing the interacting identity, hence forms the basis for strong trust establishment and access authorization. The trust built on cryptographic authentication is normally binary, i.e., full trust (i.e. the value of trust being 1) if authentication is successful otherwise no trust (the trust value being 0) [16] . However, in the UC environment, it is high likely that two entities performing authentication are from two different administrative domains or organizations that have no prior business relationship and arrangement. Realizing public key based authentication in such an environment has its deployment challenge, for example, it is difficult to find the commonly trusted certificate authority by the mutually authenticating entities. The challenge is the curse facing cross-domain public key infrastructure based applications nowadays. Furthermore, limited Internet access restricted the entities' abilities of verifying the validity of the certifications, which also poses a challenge in performing certificate based authentication. Hence, there needs to be alternatives for trust establishment in the UC.
(2) Reference based trust If direct authentication is not possible, reference from trusted (or semi-trusted) entities can be used to evaluate the trustworthiness of the referee. Based on the trust levels of the recommending nodes themselves, research exists on how to calculate the level of trust on the referee from multiple references of trusted or semi-trusted entities. For example, major voting is a simple yet useful approach, algebraic trust is calculated based on inner product of trust values along a trust path and summation over multiple trust paths, and fuzzy logic based trust calculation is another approach. The reference based trust establishment is similar in terms of concept as "web of trust" used in PGP, and is a distributed trust structure.
(3) Experience based trust
The experience trust can be applied, when two entities have past interaction, or they observe the other's behaviors hence able to draw a conclusion of the other's trust level in performing a specific task. Experience based trust is widely used in ad hoc networks and sensor networks, for instance, in performing routing in ad hoc networks, the trust value is directly proportional to the ratio of the number of forwarded packets to the total number of packets assigned for the node to relay.
In existing literature, trust is computed based on past experience. However, two nodes in the UC may never encounter before, so the trust built on historical experience may not be applicable here. We propose a concept of earned trust based on challenge-evaluation or offer-evaluation at the first interaction, i.e., a newly met node initiatively offers its resource for the exchange of access right or takes the challenge from the trust evaluator, such as performing some tasks requested by the evaluator, for the trust assessment. Therefore, the experience based trust can be formed based on either past or new/current interaction.
(4) Policy based trust
Policy based trust is the most flexible and open trust model among the four. It can define a default trust value and choose one method from the authentication based, the reference based, and the experience based trust models to be the base line trust model, or specify the order and the condition for a specific model among the three to be used. The latter integrated approach is referred as situation aware trust establishment. Using the policy based approach, it is easy to incorporate new trust models when they are available. Policy based approach also facilitates negotiation for trust establishment via policy negotiation. Hence, the policy based trust is well suited for heterogeneous UC entities.
III.D. Example Applications and Scenarios
We will illustrate the formation, development and termination of an Amoeba with its three dynamic components and trust establishment approaches in two aviation UC applications: networked enabled cabin services, and border surveillance sensor network. To demonstrate the applicability of the framework to a wide range of applications, we also apply Amoeba framework to privacy-preserving healthcare.
Network Enabled Cabin Services
Background: Aircraft systems are divided into three distinct domains, aircraft control domain, airline information service (AIS) domain and passenger information and entertainment services (PIES) domain for which statutory, regulatory, and certification requirements are different. Cabin systems spans two of there aircraft systems, i.e., AIS and PIES. We will illustrate how passenger (and their personal smart phone or laptops), cabin crew (and their hand held devices), maintenance mechanics (and their maintenance laptops, RFID readers etc), Transportation Security Administration (TSA, and their computers) are dynamically associated with these two different domains, forming AIS Amoeba and PIES Amoeba. Figure 2 illustrates how AIS and PIES Amoebas change during a United Airlines (UA) airplane flying from Seattle SEATAC airport to Tokyo NARITA airport. While the UA plane is landing at SEATAC airport, a UA maintenance mechanic (Agent M1) performs services to the plane by signing into the AIS Amoeba and then signed off after services are finished. Before taking off, flight attendants (Agents FA1,…, FAn) sign into the AIS Amoeba for airline operation information and cabin services, and also into the PIES Amoeba to prepare entertainment for passengers. During the final preparation for taking off, a SEATAC TSAs (Agent TSA1), who has authority to access both AIS and PIES domains/Amoeba, reviews the final list of passengers and luggage and then signs off both Amoeba. During the flight, passengers (P1, …,Pm) are allowed to join PIES Amoeba after negotiating the price for Internet access based on their requested service quality. Before landing, the passengers are disengaged from the PIES Amoeba. After landing at Tokyo, a NARITA TSAs (Agent TSA2) will access AIS Amoeba to check the list of passengers and luggage. An ANA maintenance crew member (Agent M2), who services both ANA and other skyteam alliance partners' aircraft, will examine and provide maintenance service to the landed UA aircraft. Later the ANA maintenance member, UA flight attendants, the NARITA TSA will sign off AIS Amoeba either simultaneously or at different time.
Scenario description (with introduction of agents):
Resources and assets:
The asset to be protected is the information contained in AIS and PIES domains. Trust Establishment: To deal with highly dynamic nature presented in the above AIS and PIES communities of trust, proper policy regarding accessing AIS and PIES domains should be established in advance. For example, AIS domain allow access from flight attendants of owning airlines as well as those of partner airlines, but the level of access rights may be different and the difference is defined using policy. PIES domains provide general free-ofcharge information as well as paid service (such as Internet access), and passengers can purchase a one-time key to establish cryptographic based trust with PIES domains. TSAs in both SEATAC and NARITA have authority to access to business sensitive and private information, such as a list of passengers and luggage, strong cryptographic based authentication (such as using smart card) should be in place to prevent abuse of the authorized rights. This requires a common CA of SEATA, NARITA and UA airlines or signing CA certificates are preloaded to the AIS domain of the UA airplane. ANA maintenance crew can join the AIS Amoeba by either authentication (via prearranged trust anchor as ANA and UA are partners) or referred by UA attendants. Scenario description (with introduction of agents): United States (US) and Canada collaboratively monitor a boarder area using sensor networks, as shown in Figure 3 . Agents US1, US2, and US3 are US sensors, and agents CS1 and CS2 are Canadian sensors. At time t0, the sensor network Amoeba formed by US1, US2, and US3 detects an intruder and it wakes up CS1 and CS2, and includes them in the expanded surveillance Amoeba. As the intruder approaches, at time t1, the intrusion severity increases to such a level that the monitoring policy, P, changes to P', which seeks the surveillance help from the sky. A USAF helicopter (Agent H) flying by is called upon, starting to watch the sensitive area. At time t2, the intruder is out of the sight of the USAF helicopter, and the surveillance system starts to request information from a satellite with the help of the control and commander center. Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics in the Amoeba and policy.
The asset to be protected is the border area; the resources are the Amoeba agents' monitoring capabilities.
Trust Establishment:
The US sensors US1, US2, US3 belong to the same administrative domain, and they should have the certificates signed by the common certificate authority so they can build strong trust via cryptographic authentication. Canadian sensors can join the Amoeba either authentication (via pre-arranged trust anchor as US and Canada are allies) or by the reference based approach. The USAF helicopter is included in the Amoeba either by cross-reference or by past experience. The NRO satellite joins the Amoeba based on its past behaviors. 
Privacy-Preserving Healthcare
Scenario description (with introduction of agents): Let us consider the following privacy-preserving healthcare scenario, as shown in Figure 4 . A patient (Agent P) visits his/her primary doctor (Agent D). After the nurse on duty (Agent N1) examines her, the primary doctor finds the condition is complicated and forms a team of specialists (Agents S1, S2) to collaborate on the patient's case. The primary physician retrieves the patient's related Electronic Health Record (EHR) (such as medical data and image), and shares the EHR with other physicians for review and diagnosis. The patient was decided to be retained in hospital for treatment. As an in-patient, the patient health condition is monitored by sensors (Agent M) and her EHR will be updated by newly generated sensor data. During her hospital stay, her family (Agent F) might be authorized to access her EHR and even make decisions if needed. And other nurses (Agent N2) will take care of her daily activities. Upon her recovering, the patient will be discharged from the hospital. The EHR is the private asset that the patient wants to and the application aims to protect.
Resource/Asset: the patient's EHR; Policy: The access to EHR need be in compliance with HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) The agents in the Amoeba should access the only part of EHR that is necessary for making treatment decisions.
Stages: registration, examination, collaborative diagnosis, in-patient treatment, discharge. Trust Establishment: Agents D, S1, S2, and N1, N2 are medical professionals, they should have (i) associated public key based certificates to first authenticate themselves; and (ii) the necessary credentials (such as from a medical board) to prove their eligibility as qualified healthcare providers. Agent F, as a family member, should be in the pre-arranged (default) list of trusted identities defined by the policy. Hospital sensors monitoring the patient's conditions should be verifiable by using reference-based (by the hospital authority) trust model. Figure 4 : Privacy-preserving healthcare Amoeba at different stages. Please note the Amoeba is dissolved after patient's discharge. Notations for agents: P: patient; D: primary doctor; S1, S2: specialists; N1, N2: nurses; M: sensor; and F: family member.
IV. Future Work
To realize the concept of an Amoeba (i.e., a community of trust) for collaboration in the UC environment, many research issues need further investigation. Modeling of an Amoeba to guide the design and predict the performance of an Amoeba is on the top of our research list. As a policy-driven trust community, an Amoeba heavily relies on policy management and policy negotiation for authentication and authorization. Distributed, scalable policy management and efficient policy negotiation are open research problems. As an Amoeba presents high group dynamics, secure group management so the group resources and assets are only accessible to current valid members is an important topic. Although four trust establishment approaches are discussed in this paper, a unified trust evaluation approach by integrating them seamlessly is worth further investigation, regardless of an entity's ability in getting multiple credentials suitable for different evaluation approaches separately. The last but not the least, we would like to prototype the Amoeba concept. The prototyping will require a design of overall security architecture for the selected UC applications and bring up implementation issues and further research issues to be resolved.
